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Abstract 
 
In traditional economics the decision-making process for individuals has effectively 
no role for ethics as individuals are self-interested. The key concepts in economics 
which determine the role of ethics in the decision-making process are utility, 
rationality and methodological individualism and hence how these can be and are 
formulated and combined determines different roles for ethics in economics. Amitai 
Etzioni, Amartya Sen and John Broome use different definitions of these concepts and 
hence find different problems and possibilities for a greater role for ethics in 
economics. This paper integrates the different approaches of these authors and 
suggests a general mono-utility framework for incorporating ethics into economics 
whereby the concept of utility requires adaptation. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
In traditional economics individuals are assumed to be self-interested, and hence the 
decision-making process for individuals currently has effectively no role for ethics. 
Hausman and McPherson (1993), in their renowned survey of the literature regarding 
economics and ethics, ask the prominent question “To be a good person, one must take 
ethics seriously. But can the same be said about being a good economist? Does morality 
matter to economic analysis?” (1993: 671). Casual empiricism suggests that ethical 
considerations impact on decision making, hence arguably morality does matter to 
economic analysis. By adapting the self-interested homo economicus to be other-
regarding as well as self-interested, this will enable a greater role for ethics within 
economics. 
 
Standard economic theory models behaviour using constrained maximisation, where 
individuals are rational and have well defined utility functions that represent their 
preferences, and choose their action by maximising their utility subject to appropriately 
defined constraints. Behavioural relationships are obtained by observing how choices 
change when the conditions the individual faces are altered. This approach to decision-
making ignores ethical considerations, as when the individual assesses the consequences 
of choosing each bundle in order to decide which to consume, only the consequences that 
the individual faces are considered, and hence the consequences faced by others are not 
considered. Therefore, the individual is motivated only by self-interest and is not 
motivated by ethical considerations, such as altruism, sympathy or fairness. Although this 
individual may be classed as being selfishly self-interested, they are only so because the 
analysis does not allow them to be otherwise. The individual is therefore self-interested 
rather than selfish, as they would only be selfish if they considered the consequences 
faced by others and subsequently decided to ignore them. Furthermore, although the 
choice the individual makes may be the choice that is the most ethical, this occurs by 
chance not through intent. Therefore, although the choice may be ethical, the individual is 
not ethical as they act only in their self-interest and are unaware of how their decisions 
impact upon others. 
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 A self-interested individual can be ethical, yet is not ethical in the standard framework. 
To clarify, in this paper ethical behaviour is separated into two types; first-order and 
second-order.1 First-order ethical behaviour may be described as doing the right course of 
action simply because it is right, and no benefit needs to be, or indeed is, derived by the 
individual as a result of performing the action. Second-order ethical behaviour may be 
described as doing the right course of action, but that action will in some way benefit the 
individual, and hence the individual performs the right course of action in part because 
they derive utility from it.2 The behaviour in each case will reach the same ethical 
outcome and both can involve ethical considerations, as the difference lies in the 
principle of action that causes this behaviour, not the final outcome. The principle of 
action that causes the ethical behaviour may be thought of as involving two factors; the 
first factor involves the undertaking of a commitment to ethical considerations, and the 
second factor entails that a utility gain is derived from ethical actions. First-order ethical 
behaviour occurs when the principle of action involves the first factor alone, and second-
order ethical behaviour involves both factors.  
 
The separation of two types of ethical behaviour, although not the terms used, is in 
accordance with the discussion of Sen (1977), who argues that ethical behaviour can 
either demonstrate sympathy or commitment, where the notions of commitment and 
sympathy accord with first-order and second-order ethical behaviour respectively. 
Sympathy reflects the notion that your welfare is directly affected by a concern for other 
individuals, whereas commitment reflects the notion that although your welfare is not 
affected by a given situation, you are prepared to take action about the situation as you do 
not believe that the situation is ethically acceptable. Sympathy can therefore be classed as 
an extension of a self-interested preference and is a form of an externality, whereas 
commitment cannot be classed as a self-interested preference. Therefore, second-order 
ethical behaviour is an extension of the self-interested framework where the individual 
can derive utility from acting ethically, whereas a first-order ethical act is undertaken 
simply because it is right, not because the individual derives utility from it, and hence it is 
inappropriate to think of the individual deriving utility from first-order ethical behaviour. 
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For example, the behaviour of an adult jumping in a river to save an unknown drowning 
child although they themselves face the risk of drowning is first-order ethical, because the 
principle of action requires only that the act is right, not that the individual also derives 
positive utility from doing the act. However, if the drowning child was not unknown but 
was instead their daughter, the principle of action is in part self-interested as they will 
derive utility from the survival of the child, if only from the continued survival of their 
genes, and hence the behaviour is second-order ethical. In standard economic theory 
homo economicus is neither first-order nor second-order ethical, they are self-interested, 
as any ethical outcome does not occur through intent, as the individual is unaware of how 
their decisions impact upon others. We argue in section VI that the mono-utility 
framework cannot facilitate first-order ethical behaviour, but that it can facilitate second-
order ethical behaviour, and hence this is the approach taken in section VII. 
 
In order to incorporate ethics into economics, the assumption of self-interested 
individuals must be adapted in order to enable individuals to have ethical considerations 
and social awareness. Therefore, in order to incorporate ethics into economics, the 
concepts which require and reinforce the assumption of the self-interested individual 
must be examined in order to determine whether it is indeed possible to adapt these 
concepts in order to enable an ethically and socially aware individual who has other-
regarding preferences. Arguably, the key concepts in economics which determine the role 
of ethics in the decision-making process through their current requirements and 
reinforcements of the self-interested individual are utility, rationality and methodological 
individualism. Therefore, the ways in which utility, rationality and methodological 
individualism can be and are formulated and combined determine different roles for 
ethics in economics. Amitai Etzioni, Amartya Sen and John Broome use different 
definitions of these concepts and hence find different problems and possibilities for a 
greater role for ethics in economics. 
 
Sections II, III and IV outline the arguments of respectively Amitai Etzioni, Amartya 
Sen, and John Broome, focussing upon the key concepts of utility and rationality. The 
discussion focuses upon their perceptions of the current concepts of utility and rationality 
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used in economics, not on what they believe is most productive or desirable. In section V 
methodological individualism will be discussed, and in section VI the views of Etzioni, 
Sen and Broome will be contrasted and considered alongside methodological 
individualism, and mono-utility and multiple utility frameworks will be discussed. In 
section VII a general framework will be discussed drawing on the insights from Etzioni, 
Sen and Broome. This approach is chosen because the conceptions of utility and 
rationality when combined with methodological individualism form a foundation for the 
final framework of choice. Therefore, when the conceptions of utility, rationality and 
methodological individualism are combined they determine behaviour and the role of 
ethics in the final choice framework, and hence they determine the role for ethics in the 
decision-making process. This framework is not explicitly used in the literature, yet the 
focus and reasoning behind the choice of framework is consistent with the existing 
literature. This paper is not a survey of the literature, it is a survey focussing on three 
important differing approaches in order to integrate the different approaches of these 
authors and to suggest a general framework for incorporating ethics into economics. 
 
II  ETZIONI 
 
Etzioni (1988) states that the neoclassical concept of rational utility maximisation has two 
factors, where firstly the most efficient means are chosen to achieve the individual’s goal, 
and secondly the goal of an individual’s action is to maximise their utility, where utility is 
only concerned with self-interest. Etzioni finds this definition unsuitable, as the second 
factor requires that individuals who are other-regarding will be deemed irrational. 
Therefore, Etzioni believes that rationality should focus upon the means of reaching a 
decision, rather than the value judgement of the goal that should be achieved. Etzioni 
argues that the neoclassical definition of rationality requires self-interest due to its focus 
upon utility, where utility is only concerned with self-interest, yet this is undesirable. The 
neoclassical concept of rationality suffers from the problem that either all individual 
behaviour is assumed to be rational, or rationality is defined such that practically all 
behaviour must be rational, and hence the concept may be regarded as a tautology. 
Etzioni suggests that the most productive definition of rationality is instrumental 
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rationality, where decision-making is based on deliberation, where the individual collects 
and uses information to reach a decision using sound reasoning. Therefore it is the 
process of making the decision, not the consequences of the decision, that are important.  
 
Etzioni (1986, 1988) outlines three different types of utility that are currently used in 
economics: pleasure-utility, interdependent-utility and X-utility. Pleasure-utility is where 
utility represents happiness, satisfaction and pleasure, as developed from Jeremy 
Bentham. Interdependent-utility is where utility is interdependent in the sense that an 
individual can gain satisfaction from another individual’s pleasure. This type of utility 
therefore assumes that utility represents happiness, satisfaction and pleasure, but 
furthermore the individual’s happiness, satisfaction and pleasure can also be affected by 
the happiness, satisfaction and pleasure of another individual. Etzioni is concerned that 
this may lead to a tautology where the individual can gain happiness, satisfaction and 
pleasure from anything and everything, namely all observed actions can be explained by 
some motivation and hence all actions are a result of maximising satisfaction. X-utility is 
the formal measure of utility where utility is a measure which is used to represent other 
values, such as in formal economic models where utility represents the ordinal values of 
the satisfaction of preferences. This definition of utility is reliant upon preference 
rankings, and the preferences themselves are not clearly defined, as different rankings 
may be given depending upon whether the preferences are regarding, for example, 
consumption or ethical value. 
 
Therefore, pleasure-utility requires self-interest and does not enable other-regarding 
motivation. Interdependent-utility does allow self-interested and other-regarding 
motivation, yet suffers from the problem that it may encompass everything as all actions 
are a result of maximising satisfaction. X-utility is dependent upon preferences, and 
hence will require self-interest only if the preferences require self-interest. Etzioni argues 
that none of the three types of utility can adequately represent satisfaction and 
affirmation. Satisfaction is obtained by satisfying self-interested preferences and hence is 
obtained by doing actions that the individual likes, enjoys and finds pleasurable, whereas 
affirmation is obtained by satisfying ethical or other-regarding preferences and hence 
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need not be likable, enjoyable or pleasurable, for example, refraining from premarital sex 
or religious fasting involves a sense of satisfaction that may not be best described as 
being enjoyable or pleasurable. An ethical act, which achieves affirmation, may not 
necessarily be the act which gives the individual the most satisfaction. The three types of 
utility as described above adequately represent satisfaction, but fail to adequately 
represent affirmation, and hence are suitable for representing self-interested preferences 
but not for representing other-regarding preferences.  
 
The above discussion of rationality and utility suggests that Etzioni views rationality as 
not necessarily requiring the maximisation of self-interest, yet believes that the current 
conception of mono-utility is unable to adequately represent other-regarding preferences, 
and hence requires self-interested preferences. Therefore, the current concepts of 
rationality and utility combined together form a model of behaviour based upon the 
maximisation of self-interest, yet in order to move toward a model enabling non-self-
interested preferences only the concept of utility requires adaptation. 
 
III  SEN 
 
Sen (1987) suggests that two different definitions of rationality are used in economics, 
which are internal consistency of choice, and maximisation of self-interest. Internal 
consistency of choice may be necessary for rationality, yet internal consistency of choice 
alone does not seem sufficient for rationality, as we could consistently always act to 
achieve exactly the opposite of what we want to achieve. Sen (1987) therefore suggests 
that rationality should require that you act so as to ensure that you achieve what you want 
to achieve. Rationality as the maximisation of self-interest requires that the choices of the 
individual are concerned solely with the maximisation of their own self-regarding 
preferences. Sen questions whether it is correct to classify self-interest as the only 
motivation, rather than one of many motivations. Sen suggests that neither the definition 
of rationality as internal consistency of choice nor as the maximisation of self-interest are 
ideal, yet Sen uses the definition of rationality as the maximisation of self-interest. 
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Sen states that “ utility is, at best, a reflection of a person’s well-being” (1987: 40). The 
definition of well-being that Sen uses is crucial, yet he never appears to explicitly define 
well-being. Sen seems to use well-being as representing whether an individual feels good, 
well and happy in their mental state and body, yet his arguments also seem to suggest that 
well-being is affected only by self-interest, as he does not seem to believe that well-being 
is dependent upon or even affected by the well-being of others. Therefore, well-being is a 
reflection of rationality as the maximisation of self-interest, as well-being is determined 
by the maximisation of self-interest, and hence represents personal advantage alone. Sen 
argues that the concept of utility as a measurement of well-being is too narrow, and the 
argument can be divided into three main points. These points argue, using interrelated 
reasons, that the concept of utility as a measure of well-being causes utility to have a 
limited scope as the concept is restrictive and somewhat unrealistic. The argument is not 
that the current concept of utility should be rejected, but that economics would benefit if 
the concept of utility was widened to incorporate additional factors, such that these 
additional factors and well-being can determine and affect utility, rather than utility being 
determined by well-being alone. Confusion may arise in the discussion of this issue, as 
the current conceptions of both utility and well-being are problematic, as each represents 
the other. Therefore, to clarify, under our interpretation either utility needs to be altered 
in order to include aspects other than well-being where well-being is identified by 
personal advantage alone, or utility can remain unaltered but then well-being needs to be 
altered in order to include aspects other than personal advantage.  
 
Firstly, although utility can reflect well-being, this may be insufficient, and furthermore 
well-being may be better described as something other than utility. Secondly, Sen (1985, 
1987) argues that an individual has both an ‘agency aspect’ and a ‘well-being aspect’, 
and each is relevant and important for the assessment of outcomes and actions in the 
decision-making process. The well-being aspect examines achievements in the context of 
their personal advantage alone, whereas the agency aspect examines achievements in 
terms of objectives and values other than personal advantage, such as autonomy and 
personal liberty. Failing to recognise the agency aspect of individuals means that ethical 
actions arise as a response to circumstances or because the ethical outcome coincides 
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with the maximisation of self-interest, rather than through ethical motivations which are 
recognised by the agency aspect. Therefore, Sen (1985) argues that although well-being 
is of intrinsic value and is fundamentally important, this does not lead to the conclusion 
that it is the only source that has intrinsic value and importance. 
 
Thirdly, Sen (1985, 1987) argues that an individuals’ freedom may be seen as being 
valuable in addition to their achievements, as the freedom that an individual has may be 
seen as being valuable regardless of what the individual achieves as a result of the 
freedom. For example, choosing x when y is available may be seen as being different to 
choosing x when y is not available. Therefore, in addition to individual utilities, rights 
and liberties are also seen as having intrinsic value for an ethical evaluation of outcomes.  
 
The above discussion of rationality and utility suggests that Sen views rationality as 
requiring the maximisation of self-interest and believes that the current conception of 
utility is inadequate as it measures only well-being, and well-being values achievements 
in terms of personal advantage alone. Therefore, the concept of rationality and utility 
combined together form a model of behaviour based upon the maximisation of self-
interest. The separation of the agency and well-being aspects of an individual do not and 
will not occur in a framework of self-interested behaviour, and vice versa, as in a 
framework focusing upon utility as well-being a separation of behaviour from the 
maximisation of self-interest does not and will not occur. Therefore, in order to expand 
rational behaviour beyond the maximisation of self-interest and to expand the definition 
of utility beyond well-being so as to enable a role for ethics in the decision-making 
process, the concepts of rationality and utility need to be simultaneously widened.  
 
IV  BROOME 
 
Broome’s view regarding rationality is not explicit, as although he assumes that 
rationality holds he never clearly explains what he believes rationality is. However, it is 
clear from Broome’s discussion that he believes that a rational individual optimises, but 
he does not believe that rationality requires that the individual is self-interested, which is 
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consistent with the definition used by Harsanyi (1982). Broome seems to believe that any 
assumption that an individual is self-interested is derived from the definition of what the 
individual is maximising, and consequently whatever the individual is maximising does 
not have to be based solely upon self-interest. 
 
Broome (1991(a)) suggests that there is great confusion over the term utility, where 
although utility is given many different meanings, the two main definitions of ‘good’ and 
‘that which represents an individuals preferences’ are confusing and misleading if used 
interchangeably, and hence the definition which should be and is mainly adopted is utility 
as that which represents an individual’s preferences. Modern axiomatic utility theory 
assumes that provided an individual’s preferences conform to some axioms they can be 
represented using a utility function, where greater utility is given to the preferred option, 
and hence utility is the value of a function that represents an individual’s preferences, and 
hence is defined as “that which represents a person’s preferences” (1991(a): 3).  
 
Broome outlines a problem caused by having two separate and frequently used 
definitions of utility, because the option which an individual prefers may not necessarily 
be the option which is best for them, and hence which gives them the most ‘good’. If 
utility represents preferences, and utility also represents good, there may be a 
contradiction, as it seems feasible to suggest that an individual may not always prefer the 
option which is best for them. For example, we may prefer chocolate to apples, yet apples 
may be better for us as they will do us the most ‘good’.  
 
Broome concludes that the meaning of utility in economics is that which represents 
preferences, and utility should not be used to mean ‘good’ as this leads to confusion, and 
hence the term ‘good’ should be used to mean good. If utility is that which represents 
preferences, and rationality requires that preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility 
theory, this suggests that provided our preferences satisfy certain axioms, our preferences 
do not have to be self-interested, and hence there is a role for ethics in the decision-
making process. Therefore, Broome suggests that it may be the case that modern 
axiomatic utility theory is consistent with ethical considerations. The conventional view 
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states that instrumental rationality takes the objectives as given, and then involves 
calculating how to best meet those objectives, which is usually the objective of 
maximising utility (Hargreaves-Heap, 1994). This suggests that the objectives are not 
specified by instrumental rationality but are taken as being exogenous, and hence it may 
be possible that the objective does not require that individuals are self-interested. 
However, some objectives will not satisfy the axioms, and it may be the case that only 
objectives requiring the maximisation of self-interest can satisfy the axioms. 
Furthermore, although the maximisation of self-interest is not explicitly assumed it may 
be an implicit assumption in modern axiomatic theory, indeed it may be an implicit 
assumption that the objective must involve the maximisation of self-interest. However, if 
the maximisation of self-interest is an implicit rather than an explicit assumption this 
suggests that it may be possible to have an objective other than the maximisation of self-
interest that is able to be used in modern axiomatic utility theory provided that the axioms 
are satisfied. That is, it may not be inconsistent to pursue an objective that involves 
ethical considerations rather than the maximisation of self-interest alone. 
 
V  METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
 
Economics, and more specifically welfare economics, focuses upon individuals through 
its commitment to methodological individualism, and hence this appears to remain as one 
barrier to increasing the association of economics with ethics. Hodgson (1994) states that 
methodological individualism can be defined as a doctrine where all social phenomena 
are explained only in terms of individuals, such as in terms of their properties, goals and 
beliefs. Methodological individualism emphasises the primary importance of the 
individual, and the virtues of self-reliance and personal independence. Therefore, the 
individual is focussed upon, and this individual is independent and self-interested and 
does not consider other individuals. To illustrate, welfare economics states that the well-
being of individuals is determined by their consumption bundles alone, yet this neglects 
the issue of relationships with others and social interaction, and hence ethical 
considerations cannot enter the decision-making process. This raises the issue that 
Hodgson’s definition may actually be referring to two separable parts of methodological 
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individualism, which are methodological individualism as an analytical method or as a 
principle of action. 
 
Arguably methodological individualism may be consistent with ethical considerations, if 
methodological individualism can have two definitions; minimal and maximal. Minimal 
methodological individualism refers to an analytical method where individuals are 
focussed upon and used to explain social phenomena. Maximal methodological 
individualism refers not only to a method where individuals are focussed upon, but also 
to a principle of action, where the well-being of an individual is unaffected by the actions 
of others. This assumes that the principle of action of the individual is not a necessary 
part of methodological individualism, and hence no specific principle of action for the 
individual is necessarily required for all social phenomena to be able to be explained only 
in terms of individuals. For example, some aspects of game theory use minimal 
methodological individualism as individuals are focussed upon, but the well-being of an 
individual is affected by the actions of others (for example Young, 1998).  
 
Minimal methodological individualism refers to an individualistic analytical method but 
allows a holistic principle of action, whereas maximal methodological individualism 
refers to an individualistic analytical method and individualism as a principle of action. 
Methodological holism can also be separated into a minimal and maximal form, where 
minimal methodological holism refers to a holistic analytical method but allows an 
individualistic principle of action, whereas maximal methodological holism refers to a 
holistic analytical method and holism as a principle of action. Figure 1 illustrates the 
difference between minimal and maximal methodological individualism and minimal and 
maximal methodological holism.  
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Figure 1 Minimal and maximal methodologies 
 
Therefore, although maximal methodological individualism is currently used in 
economics, which is the definition from Hodgson (1994) as outlined above, minimal 
methodological individualism may be sufficient, and hence it may be possible to 
incorporate ethics into this framework by assuming minimal methodological 
individualism, where individuals are focussed upon but there are no requirements 
regarding the principle of action of the individual, and hence in welfare economics well-
being and utility may be determined by factors other than the individual’s consumption, 
and relationships between individuals may be considered important. Therefore if 
methodological individualism can be separated into minimal and maximal 
methodological individualism, the increased association of economics with ethical 
considerations is easier and achievable using minimal methodological individualism, and 
an approach using methodological holism is not required and hence individuals may 
remain the focus of the analysis. 
 
VI  ETHICS IN ECONOMICS 
 
In this section, initially some linkages between the views of Etzioni, Sen and Broome are 
discussed, and following this possible problems and possibilities for incorporating ethics 
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and morality into economics are considered with reference to the relationship between 
utility, rationality and methodological individualism.3 The initial discussion is structured 
around three key components, based on earlier discussion, which are the conception of 
rationality, the conception of utility and consequently the decision-making framework. 
The assertions of these key components collectively define the linkages between the three 
writers considered above.4
 
1. Conception of rationality: 
Sen uses a definition of rationality such that rationality requires the maximisation of 
self-interest and hence individuals must be self-interested. Etzioni believes that 
rationality focuses more upon the process of making the decision, not the 
consequences of the decision. Broome believes that rationality only requires that 
individuals optimise and have preferences that satisfy the axioms of utility theory. 
Hence according to Etzioni and Broome, rationality as it is currently used does not 
necessarily require that individuals are self-interested.  
 
2. Conception of utility: 
Sen believes that the definition of utility as well-being, where well-being is measured 
in terms of personal advantage alone, means that individuals must be self-interested. 
Etzioni recognises that the interdependent-utility definition of utility allows for non-
self-interested preferences, yet is concerned that this may lead to a tautology where 
all observed actions can be explained by some motivation and hence all actions are a 
result of maximising satisfaction. Therefore, Etzioni believes that the current 
conception of utility requires self-interested preferences. Broome does not use a 
definition of utility that requires that individuals are self-interested, as Broome 
defines utility as that which represents preferences, and hence if the preferences do 
not have to be self-interested, utility will not be either. 
 
3. Decision making framework: 
Combining the conceptions of rationality and utility to determine the decision-making 
framework, Broome believes that the dominant decision-making methodology does 
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not necessarily require self-interested motivation, whereas Etzioni and Sen believe 
that it does.  
 
Therefore, in summary, Sen argues that both utility and rationality as they are currently 
conceived require that individuals are self-interested, and hence both must be adapted in 
order to increase the role of ethics in the decision-making process. Etzioni believes that 
rationality as it is currently conceived can enable non-self-interested motivation but 
utility as it is currently used requires the assumption that individuals are self-interested, 
and hence utility must be adapted in order to increase the role of ethics in the decision-
making process. Broome believes that utility and rationality as they are currently 
conceived can enable non-self-interested motivation, but both rely on the assumption that 
the individual optimises according to their preferences, and hence it is the preferences 
which currently assure that the individual is self-interested, not the conceptions of utility 
and rationality. Therefore the current uses of utility and rationality together combine to 
form a model of self-interested behaviour with no role for ethical considerations under 
the conceptions of Etzioni and Sen, and furthermore under the conceptions of Broome if 
we assume that preferences as they are currently used require self-interest. Figure two 
demonstrates whether Etzioni, Sen and Broome believe that the current conceptions of 
utility and rationality necessarily require that individuals are self-interested. 
 
Rationality
Utility
Requires self-
interest
Does not
require self-
interest
Requires self-
interest
Does not
require self-
interest
Sen
Broome
Etzioni
 
Figure 2 Viewpoints regarding the necessity of the assumption of self-interest for utility 
and rationality as they are currently used and conceived 
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 Figure 2 illustrates two separate linkages. Firstly, the rows of figure 2 illustrate that 
Etzioni and Sen have common ground, as utility and rationality as they are currently 
conceived will together form a model which requires self-interest. Broome, however, is 
somewhat different. Utility and rationality are dependent upon the individual’s 
preferences, and hence only if preferences are assumed to require self-interest will utility 
and rationality require self-interest, the assumption of self-interest relies upon 
preferences, not upon the concepts of utility and rationality. Secondly, the columns of 
figure 2 illustrate that Etzioni and Broome have common ground whereas Sen is 
somewhat different. Etzioni and Broome adopt the common position that rationality does 
not necessarily imply self-interested behaviour, whereas Sen maintains that it does. With 
regard to figure 2, it is interesting to recognise the empty cell in which rationality requires 
self-interest but utility does not. This cell can be interpreted as a plea for the recognition 
of non-self interested behaviour, but the underlying analytical method does not allow this, 
and hence without any reconstruction of the basic principles of economics this is an 
empty rhetoric. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that Broome and Sen take views in opposing corners, as Sen believes 
that the current conceptions of utility and rationality necessarily require self-interest, and 
Broome believes that they do not. If utility and rationality when combined require self-
interested behaviour maximal methodological individualism is appropriate, as maximal 
methodological individualism requires not only that individuals are focussed upon and 
used to explain social phenomena, but also that the well-being of an individual is 
unaffected by the actions of others and hence the individual is self-interested, whereas 
minimal methodological individualism only requires that individuals are focussed upon 
and used to explain social phenomena. The use of maximal methodological individualism 
leads to the assumption of self-interest where the individual is not ethical, as they act only 
in their self-interest and are unaware of how their decisions impact upon others. Once an 
individual recognises ethical considerations and has a social awareness they are aware of 
how their decisions impact upon others, and hence their principle of action is no longer 
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individualistic but is holistic, and hence maximal methodological individualism cannot be 
used as it requires an individualistic principle of action. 
 
Therefore, maximal methodological individualism is inconsistent with uses and 
definitions of utility and rationality which enable other-regarding behaviour because 
maximal methodological individualism cannot allow the well-being of an individual to be 
affected by the actions of others as this means that the principle of action is holistic rather 
than individualistic, and hence a framework which enables self-interested and other-
regarding behaviour must use minimal methodological individualism. Methodological 
individualism in its maximal form provides a barrier for the incorporation of ethical 
considerations in the decision-making process, yet this barrier can be removed by 
adopting minimal methodological individualism, which facilitates non-self-interested 
behaviour yet does not require a holistic methodological approach. These differing 
conceptions of individualism, with the implications that follow from them, are more than 
just a logical matter. If we are to develop a dialogue within economics on the importance 
of ethics, a minimal common ground is required. Without this common ground all that is 
feasibly possible is the development of isolated positions and hence the dominance of 
current thinking, that among other things marginalises ethics. 
 
 Although each of the outlined viewpoints regarding utility and rationality have their own 
internal merits, we believe that rationality does not necessarily require self-interest, and 
hence do not believe that the current concept of rationality provides a problem for the 
incorporation of ethical considerations in the decision-making process. In this aspect we 
distance ourselves from Sen. But the current usage of utility is problematic, as we believe 
that utility as it is currently used does require self-interest. Consequently we distance 
ourselves from Broome on this matter. Therefore, the problem lies only with the current 
conception of utility. We believe that utility is both a measure of well-being, as stated by 
Sen, and a representation of preferences, as stated by Broome, which are very similar to 
the pleasure-utility and formal-utility definitions outlined by Etzioni. Therefore, 
adaptation is required both for the conception of well-being and preferences, yet as they 
are interrelated the adaptation should be interrelated. 
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 The question remains how utility can be adapted in order to facilitate non-self-interested 
or other-regarding motivation. Using figure two, two possibilities emerge where an 
adaptation of the viewpoints of Etzioni and Sen from the first row potentially suggest a 
multiple utility approach, and an adaptation of the viewpoint from the bottom row of 
Broome potentially suggests a mono-utility approach. Etzioni believes that the mono-
utility framework and the concept of a single utility cannot facilitate non-self-interested 
or other-regarding preferences, Sen (1977) suggests that the mono-utility framework may 
not be the most suitable framework for analysing self-interested and non-self-interested 
preferences, whereas Broome believes that the mono-utility framework can facilitate 
ethical considerations. Etzioni endorses a multiple utility framework where individuals 
are not solely concerned with single utility maximisation, but are also motivated by 
factors such as morality, altruism and so forth, as he argues that one single concept of 
utility, however defined, will be unable to adequately represent both self-interested and 
other-regarding preferences, as it cannot account for both satisfaction and affirmation as 
there are qualitative differences between self-interested and other-regarding preferences. 
 
The multiple utility framework does not have a single grand maximand, which is where 
there is a single object to be maximised, and hence there is not a single utility function 
including, for example, self-interested and other-regarding preferences, and hence self-
interested and other-regarding expenditure cannot be traded off against each other. There 
are at least two maximands for each individual, and hence this is not in accordance with 
the standard rational choice framework. The motivation for two maximands (e.g. private 
and social) is that the different types of preferences are qualitatively different and hence 
cannot be traded-off against each other. Therefore there is not one single concept of 
utility, but two or more utilities which represent the satisfaction of different types of 
preferences. These utilities are not reducible to a single value due to their qualitative 
differences, and if they were this would be a mono-utility rather than a multiple utility 
framework. The motivation behind the multiple utility framework is extremely 
persuasive, as two different types of utility can be used to represent the satisfaction of 
self-interested and ethical preferences, hence meaning that an individual can perform an 
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ethical act simply because it is right, not because it increases their utility in the usual 
sense, as some value which is derived from performing an ethical act may be nothing 
more than a ‘warm sensation’ from knowing that they did the right action at great 
detriment to themselves, such as risking their life to save a drowning child. Therefore, in 
this framework an individual can be first-order ethical rather than simply second-order 
ethical as earlier defined in section I, as an action may be performed due to commitment 
rather than sympathy, and the sensation derived from satisfying ethical and self-interested 
preferences can be separated into affirmation and satisfaction. 
 
The multiple utility framework has the advantage over a mono-utility framework that an 
individual can be first-order ethical rather than second-order ethical, as earlier defined. In 
the mono-utility framework if other-regarding and ethical considerations enter the 
individual’s utility function the individual makes the ethical choice not only because it is 
the ethical choice, but in part because they derive utility from it. Therefore, in the mono-
utility framework the individual can be second-order ethical but not first-order ethical. 
The mono-utility framework can therefore only be used as an extension of self-interest, 
and all non-self-interested preferences must be based upon a self-interested foundation, 
whereas the multiple utility framework can facilitate pure non-self-interested preferences. 
This means that the mono-utility framework can only accommodate psychological 
egoism, where all actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest, whereas the multiple 
utility framework can accommodate psychological altruism, where at least some actions 
are motivated by factors other than self-interest. 
 
However, the multiple utility framework suffers from the problem that a formal 
specification is difficult due to the requirement of multiple maximands. It is not the 
intention to provide a full critique of the multiple utility framework here, this is done 
elsewhere (for example see Brennan (1989, 1993)), yet it is our belief that the mono-
utility framework is more suitable for the incorporation of ethical preferences, and 
furthermore this approach is used by other authors (for example see Arrow (1972), 
Becker (1981, 1991), Boulding (1973) and Collard (1978)). The mono-utility framework 
is more appropriate for the incorporation of ethical preferences because it can overcome 
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three major problems faced by the multiple utility framework. Firstly, the multiple utility 
framework fails to recognise opportunity cost or trade-offs between conflicting 
preferences due its strong separability requirement of self-interested and non-self-
interested preferences such that the different preferences must be placed in different 
separable spheres. Arguably individuals choose whether to follow self-interested 
preferences or other-regarding preferences using trade-offs and opportunity cost, as they 
will use all information and preferences to make decisions, and the individual may, for 
example, decide to act more ethically in some circumstances than if they were solely 
motivated by self-interest, as although they would yield utility from acting less ethically 
from a self-interested viewpoint they would yield a counteracting disutility from acting 
immorally, and this is facilitated in the mono-utility framework, as discussed by Brennan 
(1989).  
 
Secondly the multiple utility framework fails to unambiguously and unanimously specify 
how conflicting preferences are resolved in order to make a decision, and this is further 
aggravated by the problem that there is no trade-off between these conflicting 
preferences.5 The determination of criteria for which preferences should take priority is 
problematic, as discussed by Brennan (1989), as ethical or higher order preferences may 
actually not be ethical, especially if the preferences thought to be ethical are so purely 
due to greater reflection, as you can have premeditated murder for example, and racist or 
sexist preferences may reflect the will of society yet they should not necessarily be given 
priority over a self-interested preference of equality. Furthermore, choices may not be 
consistent with higher order or non-self-interested preferences, and hence may not 
actually be the choice the individual actually wants. The problem of how to resolve 
conflicting preferences does not arise in the mono-utility framework as there is only one 
set of preferences and one type of utility. 
 
Thirdly, the multiple utility framework fails to account for the strategic, or socio-
political, interaction of individuals, as each individual is considered in isolation without 
considering the effects that an individuals’ decisions, and even their preferences, have on 
other individuals, and vice versa. The interdependency and interaction of individuals is an 
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important aspect of ethical and social behaviour and decision-making, and this can be 
incorporated into the mono-utility framework using one set of preferences and one type 
of utility that may be affected by non-self-interested factors. 
 
The mono-utility framework can facilitate ethical considerations, where the individual 
has a holistic principle of action as they consider how their decisions impact upon others, 
yet the individual is second-order ethical rather than first-order ethical, as they still 
undertake the ethical action in part because they gain utility from doing so. The mono-
utility framework may be unable to accommodate for the qualitatively different 
sensations of affirmation and satisfaction as outlined by Etzioni which are obtained from 
satisfying ethical or self-interested preferences, as doing so would require multiple 
utilities rather than a single utility. Instead, the mono-utility framework enables the 
satisfaction of both ethical and self-interested preferences to be measured using a single 
umbrella measurement of ‘utility’, which therefore enables the usage of a formal 
framework where decisions can be made using a consideration of all types of preferences. 
In this extension of the standard framework, utility as it is currently conceived requires a 
minor adaptation, as although utility still represents the satisfaction of preferences, these 
preferences are not concerned with self-interest alone, rather these preferences also 
involve and are concerned with ethical considerations and social awareness. Therefore, 
utility is not a representation of well-being where well-being reflects personal advantage 
alone, rather utility reflects well-being where well-being reflects personal advantage and 
objectives and values other than personal advantage, such as morality, altruism, 
autonomy and personal liberty, that in some way benefit the individual.6  
 
It is not claimed that using one single measurement of the umbrella term of utility for the 
satisfaction of different preferences is unproblematic, yet when combined with the 
standard mono-utility framework it will enable morality to enter the decision-making 
framework, where an individual may be ethical, but in part will be ethical because it is in 
their self-interest to do so, and hence this is more in accordance with economic discourse 
than ethical discourse. Using a mono-utility framework means that an ethical principle of 
action is still built upon a self-interested foundation, and hence the sensation derived 
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from the satisfaction of all preferences has a common underlying property that it benefits 
the individual in some way. The sensation from satisfying these preferences will be 
qualitatively different, just as the sensation of eating a chilli is very different that that of 
eating ice cream, yet both have many similarities, and these similarities are arguably 
more important than the differences. 
 
VII POSSIBILITIES 
 
Therefore ethics may be incorporated into economics using a decision-making framework 
that uses minimal rather than maximal methodological individualism and although the 
current role of rationality may remain, the current conception of utility requires 
adaptation as discussed above, whilst maintaining a mono-utility approach. One 
possibility is to amend the single utility function such that non-self-interested factors can 
affect utility, and hence the individual has other-regarding preferences as well as self-
regarding preferences. This approach is not unique (for example see Becker (1981, 1991), 
Boulding (1973) and Collard (1978)), and will overcome the first two problems faced by 
the multiple utility framework as outlined above, as firstly individuals may choose 
whether to follow self-interested preferences or other-regarding preferences using trade-
offs and opportunity cost as they will use all information and preferences to make 
decisions, and secondly the problem of how to resolve conflicting preferences does not 
arise in the mono-utility framework as there is only one set of preferences and one type of 
utility. However, an extra step must be taken in order to combat the third problem faced 
by the multiple utility framework, where it fails to account for the strategic, or socio-
political, interaction of individuals. This extra step must be consistent with the current 
conception of rationality and minimal methodological individualism, where 
individualism is used as the analytical method but not as the principle of action. 
Therefore we suggest that an amended mono-utility function may be used to calculate the 
payoffs for an ethical strategic game, in order to analyse the strategic ethical interaction 
between two individuals. 
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A simple utility function can be written  where U  is utility, aEU = E  is expenditure on 
goods and services, and  is the common parameter, and this functional form may be 
used to develop a simple economic analysis of morality. Assuming a community with a 
population of n individuals, two players are chosen at random from the community. 
Assume a two player game, where each player can behave ethically or non-ethically. 
Income for each player is 
a
( 2,1 )=iYi , and this income differs from expenditure, , 
because each player may donate some income to the other player, , and may receive a 
donation of income in return: 
iE
iD
 
2111 DDYE +−=             (1)
1222 DDYE +−=              (2) 
 
1D  represents a donation from player 1 to player 2. Utility is derived from expenditure, 
and furthermore if a player behaves ethically they donate some income to the other player 
and there is a positive utility derived from making the donation. If a player behaves non-
ethically no donation is made and no positive utility can be derived from donating 
resources to the other player: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 111 211121111 1 τβα DYmDDDYmU +−++−=  where 0,, 111 >τβα     (3)     
( ) ( )( ) 222 122212222 1 τβα DYmDDDYmU +−++−=  where 0,, 222 >τβα       (4) 
 
im  is an indicator function which reflects the principle of action of player i, where: 
 
im  =  1,    if player i has an ethical principle of action, hence ,        (5) 0>iD
             0,   if player i has a non-ethical principle of action,  hence . 
  
0=iD
 
Utility is derived from expenditure, where negative utility is derived from a loss of 
income and positive utility is derived from a gain in income, and furthermore utility is 
derived from donating income to the other player, where this donation will increase the 
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income and consumption opportunities and hence utility of the other player. Therefore, 
the donation has both a positive and a negative impact on utility, and hence for player 1 
the size of the donation will be affected by the parameters iα  and iβ . Although the 
satisfaction or sensation derived either from expenditure or from a donation will be 
significantly different, they are still measured under the umbrella term of utility, where 
utility represents the satisfaction of extended self-interested preferences, where these 
preferences can encompass ethical and altruistic preferences. 
 
Ethical behaviour involves undertaking some activity that involves a cost to the player 
undertaking the activity but involves a direct benefit to the other player in the game. In 
generic terms this activity is called here a donation that is costly to the donor but has 
direct income advantages to the recipient. Each donor has the ability to choose the 
amount of the donation but is unable to exert influence over the consumption choices 
undertaken by the other player with their donation. Furthermore, neither player can exert 
influence over whether the other individual makes a reciprocal donation. A donation is 
not undertaken for any instrumental individual advantage, and although this action will 
be second-order ethical, this action will not be first-order ethical as earlier described, 
because the individual makes the donation in part because they derive utility from it. 
Therefore, utility represents the satisfaction of extended self-interested preferences rather 
than non-self-interested preferences. The indicator function, , is a step towards 
recognising the first factor of a principle of action as defined in section I, where a 
commitment to ethical considerations is undertaken through the existence of . 
im
im
 
Non-ethical behaviour involves gaining no utility from a donation, and thus implies that 
no donation will be made. If a player does not behave ethically it does not follow that 
they are behaving immorally. The specification of the utility function means that players 
do not consider the effects experienced by the other player and subsequently ignore those 
effects to the detriment of the other player, which would be the case if they were 
behaving immorally. Rather, the effects experienced by the other player are never 
considered and hence the player is self-interested and hence non-ethical rather than 
selfishly self-interested as discussed in section I.7
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 An example of this scenario is two people living in a large shared house together, where 
each individual donates some money to the other in part because they realise it will 
increase the utility of their housemate due to their increased income and hence 
consumption opportunities, but in part because they get utility from doing so. Another 
example is two people amongst many new acquaintances on an evening out, where they 
take it in turns to buy a round of drinks for both individuals, assuming autonomous 
independent individuals where neither individual exerts influence over what the other 
individual chooses to consume. These scenarios may be more persuasive and more 
interesting if we assume asymmetric income, and an analysis of the relationships between 
these individuals would enable a greater ethical discussion, yet the model we propose is a 
simple one. Although these scenarios would rarely warrant moral discourse, these are a 
simplified analysis of altruism occurring in standard economic discourse. A multi-player 
model would enable advantageous analysis, yet here it is decided to remove multiplayer 
complications and hence to focus upon a two player model, as done elsewhere (Minkler 
(2004)). 
 
Assuming a one-shot game, finding the utility maximising level of donations for each 
individual is problematic. Neither individual has an intimate relationship with the other 
individual, and hence cannot accurately predict how the other individual will behave. 
Neither individual has complete information in order to know the principle of action of 
the other individual, as the principle of action is an internal motivation rather than an 
externally observable characteristic. For each individual their utility maximising level of 
donations could be found, yet this suffers from the problem that the utility maximising 
level of donations would be dependent upon whether the other individual also chose to 
donate, yet in a one-shot game of this nature each player does not have complete 
information and cannot know the action of the individual in advance.8 It is therefore 
assumed that the individual will choose the size of their donation through consideration 
of their preferences and hence of the parameters iα  and iβ , furthermore as the individual 
is a member of a community it is also expected that their level of donations may be 
influenced by appealing to previously observed levels of donations made by individuals 
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within their community, as this indicates socially acceptable levels of donations. 
However, whilst observing average donation levels the individual will also observe the 
probability that community members act ethically and hence make donations. This does 
not pose a major problem for the model, it illustrates the role of acculturation and the 
reinforcement of community values, and these factors may indeed influence the principle 
of action of the individual which is reflected by , and hence influence whether the 
individual decides to act ethically, as our ethical values are affected by our social 
surroundings. However, social and societal factors will not be the only factor affecting 
our principle of action, as this is an internal motivation which will be affected by many 
internalised values and objectives.  
im
 
We can now define a game in which either player can behave ethically or non-ethically. 
For player 1, we can specify the utility payoffs as follows: 
 
Player 2
Player 1
Ethical
behaviour
Non-ethical
behaviour
Ethical
behaviour
Non-ethical
behaviour
( ) 11 1211 βα DDDY +− ( ) 11 111 βα DDY −
1
1
τY( ) 121 τDY +
 
Figure 3 Ethical game showing the utility payoffs for player 1 
 
Condition 1: If player 2 behaves ethically, player 1 behaves ethically if:9
( ) ( ) 111 211211 τβα DYDDDY +>+−          (6) 
 
Condition 2: If player 2 behaves non-ethically player 1 behaves ethically if: 
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( ) 111 1111 τβα YDDY >−               (7) 
 
Equivalent conditions can be derived for player 2. This demonstrates that the model 
demonstrates extended self-interest, as the individual decides whether to be ethical 
depending upon whether they will get a higher utility from being ethical, and hence 
whether it is in their self-interest to be ethical. If 21 αα = , 21 ββ = , 21 ττ =  and 21 YY = , 
three possible solutions exist, such that 
  
1. If both conditions are satisfied there is a dominance of ethical behaviour and 
hence ; 2,1,1 == imi
 
2. If neither condition is satisfied there is a dominance of non-ethical behaviour and 
hence ; and 2,1,0 == imi
 
3. If condition 1 is satisfied but condition 2 is not satisfied we have a coordination 
game with two Nash equilibria involving ethical or non-ethical behaviour as there 
is no dominant strategy, and hence the value of  is affected by the action of the 
other player.  
im
 
If both or neither conditions are satisfied, then: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0 whereYY if,0
0 whereYY if,1 
2211211
22112111
111
111
≥+<+−
≥+>+−=
DDDDD
DDDDDm
τβα
τβα
          (8) 
 
The outcomes of the game are dependent upon the values of iα , iβ , iτ , where 2,1=i , 
and hence the model can be specified such that the player will always have preferences 
such that either ethical behaviour or non-ethical behaviour will always be dominant, and 
this is due to the fact that the preferences are defined by the parameters of the utility 
functions. The outcome will also be affected by the size of  and  when the 
individual chooses to act ethically. This therefore suggests that preferences and observed 
1D 2D
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previous behaviour within the community will affect the outcomes reached in this model, 
as they determine the size of donation and whether the individual chooses to act ethically. 
 
The game where there is a coordination problem, where each player is better off choosing 
the same option as the other player, but the outcome where both players act ethically is 
the Pareto optimal outcome is of great interest. In this situation if both players can 
coordinate their actions they will achieve the Pareto optimal outcome, and this 
coordination of actions can be achieved using communication, bargaining or with the 
assistance of an external body. For example, religion may ensure that both players reach 
the Pareto optimal outcome, and hence the presence of societal values and institutions to 
promote these societal values may be of key importance in ensuring that the Pareto 
optimal outcome is achieved. More generally, the coordination game illustrates that 
simple observation of non-ethical behaviour does not imply the irrelevance, or non-
viability, of ethical behaviour. 
 
There is an implicit assumption in the above analysis that unqualified ethical behaviour 
by one player occurs if the other player is non-ethical. Arguably, more realistic behaviour 
may be represented as involving, in simple terms, a ‘grievance cost’, , to a player that 
behaves ethically when the other player does not. For player 1: 
iG
 
 
 
 -27-
Player 2
Player 1
Ethical
behaviour
Non-ethical
behaviour
Ethical
behaviour
Non-ethical
behaviour
( ) 11 1211 βα DDDY +− ( ) ( ) 11 1111 βα GDDY −−
1
1
τY( ) 121 τDY +
 
Figure 4 Ethical game showing the utility payoffs for player 1 when player 1 experiences 
a grievance cost when they behave ethically but player 2 behaves non-ethically10
 
Condition 2 may now be rewritten: 
Condition 2': If player 2 now behaves non-ethically player 1 behaves ethically if: 
( ) ( ) 111 11111 τβα YGDDY >−−                         (9) 
Condition 2' is more restrictive than condition 2, and hence this grievance cost increases 
the importance of the coordination game solution. 
 
The specification of the model suffers from the problem that each individual may have an 
ethical principle of action, yet their adherence to these ethical principles does not 
guarantee that the outcome of their behaviour will be ethical. To clarify, the model is in 
parts more deontological than consequentialist, as assuming that acting ethically is not 
the dominant strategy, the individual acting ethically whilst the other individual acts non-
ethically will have a lower utility than if they too acted non-ethically, although combined 
utility will be greater. In this situation, it does not seem an ethical outcome, however if 
we return to the earlier examples, where one housemate donates income to the other 
housemate and receives none in return, or one drinker purchasing all drinks on an 
evening out together, despite equal income in both cases. These outcomes only seem 
ethical if other factors are taken into consideration, such as the recipient housemate may 
perform all household chores, or the recipient drinker may be struggling financially, and 
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hence the model could be made richer through adaptation to incorporate factors such as 
these. 
 
VIII  CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the decision-making process for individuals and society currently has a 
small role for ethics, as individuals are self-interested. The key concepts in economics 
which determine the role of ethics in the decision-making process are utility, rationality, 
and methodological individualism and hence how these are and may be used and defined 
will determine different roles for ethics in economics. The current conception of 
rationality may be consistent with non-self-interested behaviour, and methodological 
individualism may also be consistent with non-self-interested behaviour if it is used in the 
form of minimal methodological individualism, yet the current conception of utility 
requires some adaptation in order to enable ethical considerations to have a greater role in 
the decision-making process, and a mono-utility framework is able to accommodate this.  
 
The advantages of using a mono-utility framework are that it can facilitate trade-offs 
between self-interested and non-self-interested preferences and allows for individuals to 
be more or less self-interested along a sliding scale, there is a single utility function 
which enables unambiguous criteria for a single optimal outcome to be reached, and 
furthermore it can enable strategic interaction between individuals where the actions of 
one individual will affect the actions of another individual. However, the multiple utility 
framework has the advantage over the mono-utility framework that in the multiple utility 
framework an individual can perform an act simply because it is right and not because it 
is in their self-interest to do so, whereas in the mono-utility framework if other-regarding 
and ethical considerations enter the individual’s utility function, the individual makes the 
ethical choice not only because it is right, but in part because they derive utility from it. 
Therefore, in the mono-utility framework the individual can be second-order ethical but 
not first-order ethical, as the mono-utility framework can only be used as an extension of 
self-interest, as all non-self-interested preferences must be based upon a self-interested 
foundation. 
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 An extension of the standard framework is suggested, where utility as it is currently 
conceived requires a minor adaptation, as although utility still represents the satisfaction 
of preferences, these preferences are not concerned with self-interest alone, rather these 
preferences also involve and are concerned with ethical considerations and social 
awareness. Rationality and methodological individualism do not have to be sacrificed in 
order to move toward this framework, and hence the current focus upon an individualistic 
methodological approach to decision-making does not need to be sacrificed. In the final 
section a simple framework was developed based on minimal methodological 
individualism in which the method is individualistic but behaviour need not be. This 
framework illustrates the potential importance of coordination issues to the development 
of ethical behaviour. The recognition of these issues demonstrates that institutional and 
socio-economic factors should be considered in an analysis of ethical behaviour. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1D 1
1D
1 These concepts are not to be confused with first-order and second-order preferences. 
2 Deriving and defining the right course of action is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 The debate between Sen and Broome regarding the exact definition of the term utility is illustrative of 
their deep divide on this subject and the key importance of the term utility. Broome argues that Sen uses 
utility to mean “that which utilitarians believe to constitute good” (1991(a): 9), yet Sen (1991) denies this 
and criticises Broome’s approach, and Broome (1991(b)) reinforces his original argument. This is not 
discussed further as it does not add anything to this analysis of ethics in economics. 
4 As earlier emphasised, the discussion focuses upon their perceptions of the current concepts of utility and 
rationality used in economics, not on what they believe is most productive or desirable. 
5 Although attempts have been made to unambiguously specify how conflicting preferences should be 
resolved, the application of this is not unanimous. 
6 Furthermore, utility is not used here as referring both to the satisfaction of preferences and ‘good’, as 
discussed by Broome, as no moral weight or significance is attached to the concept of utility. 
7 Please note that it does not follow that the selfishly self-interested individual is immoral. 
8 For person 1 the utility maximising level of  can be found such thatU  is differentiated with respect to 
: ( ) ( ) 0112111112111
1
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∂
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2D
. This suffers from the problem that the 
level of depends on the value of , yet this cannot be known in advance. 
9 Please note that  may take different values on either side of the inequality. 
10 The formulations used in this, and earlier, games are examples of more general Stone-Geary functions as 
first developed by Geary (1950-1951) and Stone (1954). 
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